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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-2019
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MINNESOTA, PETITIONER v. TIMOTHY
DICKERSON
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
minnesota
[June 7, 1993]

  Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court.
  In this case, we consider whether the Fourth Amend-
ment permits the seizure of contraband detected through
a police officer's sense of touch during a protective pat-
down search.
                            I
  On the evening of November 9, 1989, two Minneapolis
police officers were patrolling an area on the city's north
side in a marked squad car.  At about 8:15 p.m., one of
the officers observed respondent leaving a 12-unit apart-
ment building on Morgan Avenue North.  The officer,
having previously responded to complaints of drug sales
in the building's hallways and having executed several
search warrants on the premises, considered the building
to be a notorious -crack house.-  According to testimony
credited by the trial court, respondent began walking
toward the police but, upon spotting the squad car and
making eye contact with one of the officers, abruptly
halted and began walking in the opposite direction.  His
suspicion aroused, this officer watched as respondent
turned and entered an alley on the other side of the
apartment building.  Based upon respondent's seemingly
evasive actions and the fact that he had just left a
building known for cocaine traffic, the officers decided to
stop respondent and investigate further.
  The officers pulled their squad car into the alley and
ordered respondent to stop and submit to a patdown
search.  The search revealed no weapons, but the officer
conducting the search did take an interest in a small
lump in respondent's nylon jacket.  The officer later
testified:
-[A]s I pat-searched the front of his body, I felt a
lump, a small lump, in the front pocket.  I examined
it with my fingers and it slid and it felt to be a lump
of crack cocaine in cellophane.-  Tr. 9 (Feb. 20, 1990).
The officer then reached into respondent's pocket and
retrieved a small plastic bag containing one fifth of one
gram of crack cocaine.  Respondent was arrested and
charged in Hennepin County District Court with posses-
sion of a controlled substance.
  Before trial, respondent moved to suppress the cocaine.
The trial court first concluded that the officers were
justified under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), in
stopping respondent to investigate whether he might be
engaged in criminal activity.  The court further found that
the officers were justified in frisking respondent to ensure
that he was not carrying a weapon.  Finally, analogizing
to the -plain-view- doctrine, under which officers may
make a warrantless seizure of contraband found in plain
view during a lawful search for other items, the trial
court ruled that the officers' seizure of the cocaine did not
violate the Fourth Amendment:
      -To this Court there is no distinction as to which
sensory perception the officer uses to conclude that
the material is contraband.  An experienced officer
may rely upon his sense of smell in DWI stops or in
recognizing the smell of burning marijuana in an
automobile.  The sound of a shotgun being racked
would clearly support certain reactions by an officer.
The sense of touch, grounded in experience and
training, is as reliable as perceptions drawn from
other senses.  `Plain feel,' therefore, is no different
than plain view and will equally support the seizure
here.-  App. to Pet. for Cert. C-5.
His suppression motion having failed, respondent pro-
ceeded to trial and was found guilty.
  On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed.
The court agreed with the trial court that the investiga-
tive stop and protective patdown search of respondent
were lawful under Terry because the officers had a
reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts
that respondent was engaged in criminal behavior and
that he might be armed and dangerous.  The court
concluded, however, that the officers had overstepped the
bounds allowed by Terry in seizing the cocaine.  In doing
so, the Court of Appeals -decline[d] to adopt the plain feel
exception- to the warrant requirement.  469 N. W. 2d 462,
466 (1991).
  The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed.  Like the Court
of Appeals, the State Supreme Court held that both the
stop and the frisk of respondent were valid under Terry,
but found the seizure of the cocaine to be unconstitutional.
The court expressly refused -to extend the plain view
doctrine to the sense of touch- on the grounds that -the
sense of touch is inherently less immediate and less
reliable than the sense of sight- and that -the sense of
touch is far more intrusive into the personal privacy that
is at the core of the [F]ourth [A]mendment.-  481 N. W.
2d 840, 845 (1992).  The court thus appeared to adopt a
categorical rule barring the seizure of any contraband
detected by an officer through the sense of touch during
a patdown search for weapons.  The court further noted
that -[e]ven if we recognized a 'plain feel' exception, the
search in this case would not qualify- because -[t]he pat
search of the defendant went far beyond what is permissi-
ble under Terry.-  Id., at 843 and 844, n. 1.  As the State
Supreme Court read the record, the officer conducting the
search ascertained that the lump in respondent's jacket
was contraband only after probing and investigating what
he certainly knew was not a weapon.  See id., at 844.
  We granted certiorari, 506 U. S. ___ (1992), to resolve
a conflict among the state and federal courts over whether
contraband detected through the sense of touch during a
patdown search may be admitted into evidence.  We now
affirm.

                           II
                            A
  The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States
by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U. S. 643 (1961), guarantees -[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.-  Time and
again, this Court has observed that searches and seizures
-`conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well delineated exceptions.'-
Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U. S. 17, 19-20 (1984) (per
curiam) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357
(1967) (footnotes omitted)); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S.
385, 390 (1978); see also United States v. Place, 462 U. S.
696, 701 (1983).  One such exception was recognized in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), which held that -where
a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot- the officer may briefly stop
the suspicious person and make -reasonable inquiries-
aimed at confirming or dispelling his suspicions.  Id., at
30; see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 145-146
(1972).
  Terry further held that -[w]hen an officer is justified in
believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he
is investigating at close range is armed and presently
dangerous to the officer or to others,- the officer may
conduct a patdown search -to determine whether the
person is in fact carrying a weapon.-  392 U. S., at 24.
-The purpose of this limited search is not to discover
evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his
investigation without fear of violence . . . .-  Adams,
supra, at 146.  Rather, a protective search-permitted
without a warrant and on the basis of reasonable suspi-
cion less than probable cause-must be strictly -limited
to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons
which might be used to harm the officer or others
nearby.-  Terry, supra, at 26; see also Michigan v. Long,
463 U. S. 1032, 1049, and 1052, n. 16 (1983); Ybarra v.
Illinois, 444 U. S. 85, 93-94 (1979).  If the protective
search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the
suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its
fruits will be suppressed.  Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S.
40, 65-66 (1968).
  These principles were settled 25 years ago when, on the
same day, the Court announced its decisions in Terry and
Sibron.  The question presented today is whether police
officers may seize nonthreatening contraband detected
during a protective patdown search of the sort permitted
by Terry.  We think the answer is clearly that they may,
so long as the officer's search stays within the bounds
marked by Terry.
                            B
  We have already held that police officers, at least under
certain circumstances, may seize contraband detected
during the lawful execution of a Terry search.  In Michi-
gan v. Long, supra, for example, police approached a man
who had driven his car into a ditch and who appeared to
be under the influence of some intoxicant.  As the man
moved to reenter the car from the roadside, police spotted
a knife on the floorboard.  The officers stopped the man,
subjected him to a patdown search, and then inspected
the interior of the vehicle for other weapons.  During the
search of the passenger compartment, the police discovered
an open pouch containing marijuana and seized it.  This
Court upheld the validity of the search and seizure under
Terry.  The Court held first that, in the context of a
roadside encounter, where police have reasonable suspicion
based on specific and articulable facts to believe that a
driver may be armed and dangerous, they may conduct a
protective search for weapons not only of the driver's
person but also of the passenger compartment of the
automobile.  463 U. S., at 1049.  Of course, the protective
search of the vehicle, being justified solely by the danger
that weapons stored there could be used against the
officers or bystanders, must be -limited to those areas in
which a weapon may be placed or hidden.-  Ibid.  The
Court then held: -If, while conducting a legitimate Terry
search of the interior of the automobile, the officer should,
as here, discover contraband other than weapons, he
clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and
the Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression
in such circumstances.-  Id., at 1050; accord, Sibron, 392
U. S., at 69-70 (White, J., concurring); id., at 79 (Harlan,
J., concurring in result).
  The Court in Long justified this latter holding by
reference to our cases under the -plain-view- doctrine.
See Long, supra, at 1050; see also United States v.
Hensley, 469 U. S. 221, 235 (1985) (upholding plain-view
seizure in context of Terry stop).  Under that doctrine, if
police are lawfully in a position from which they view an
object, if its incriminating character is immediately
apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access
to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.  See
Horton v. California, 496 U. S. 128, 136-137 (1990); Texas
v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730, 739 (1983) (plurality opinion).
If, however, the police lack probable cause to believe that
an object in plain view is contraband without conducting
some further search of the object-i.e., if -its incriminating
character [is not] `immediately apparent,'- Horton, supra,
at 136-the plain-view doctrine cannot justify its seizure.
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321 (1987).
  We think that this doctrine has an obvious application
by analogy to cases in which an officer discovers contra-
band through the sense of touch during an otherwise
lawful search.  The rationale of the plain view doctrine
is that if contraband is left in open view and is observed
by a police officer from a lawful vantage point, there has
been no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and
thus no -search- within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment-or at least no search independent of the
initial intrusion that gave the officers their vantage point.
See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U. S. 765, 771 (1983); Texas
v. Brown, supra, at 740.  The warrantless seizure of
contraband that presents itself in this manner is deemed
justified by the realization that resort to a neutral magis-
trate under such circumstances would often be impractica-
ble and would do little to promote the objectives of the
Fourth Amendment.  See Hicks, supra, at 326-327;
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 467-468,
469-470 (1971) (opinion of Stewart, J.).  The same can be
said of tactile discoveries of contraband.  If a police officer
lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an
object whose contour or mass makes its identity immedi-
ately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's
privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's
search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its war-
rantless seizure would be justified by the same practical
considerations that inhere in the plain view context.
  The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected an analogy to
the plain-view doctrine on two grounds: first, its belief
that -the sense of touch is inherently less immediate and
less reliable than the sense of sight,- and second, that
-the sense of touch is far more intrusive into the personal
privacy that is at the core of the [F]ourth [A]mendment.-
481 N. W. 2d, at 845.  We have a somewhat different
view.  First, Terry itself demonstrates that the sense of
touch is capable of revealing the nature of an object with
sufficient reliability to support a seizure.  The very
premise of Terry, after all, is that officers will be able to
detect the presence of weapons through the sense of touch
and Terry upheld precisely such a seizure.  Even if it
were true that the sense of touch is generally less reliable
than the sense of sight, that only suggests that officers
will less often be able to justify seizures of unseen contra-
band.  Regardless of whether the officer detects the
contraband by sight or by touch, however, the Fourth
Amendment's requirement that the officer have probable
cause to believe that the item is contraband before seizing
it ensures against excessively speculative seizures.  The
court's second concern-that touch is more intrusive into
privacy than is sight-is inapposite in light of the fact
that the intrusion the court fears has already been
authorized by the lawful search for weapons.  The seizure
of an item whose identity is already known occasions no
further invasion of privacy.  See Soldal v. Cook County,
506 U. S. ___, ___ (1992); Horton, supra, at 141; United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109, 120 (1984).  Accord-
ingly, the suspect's privacy interests are not advanced by
a categorical rule barring the seizure of contraband plainly
detected through the sense of touch.

                           III
  It remains to apply these principles to the facts of this
case.  Respondent has not challenged the finding made by
the trial court and affirmed by both the Court of Appeals
and the State Supreme Court that the police were justi-
fied under Terry in stopping him and frisking him for
weapons.  Thus, the dispositive question before this Court
is whether the officer who conducted the search was
acting within the lawful bounds marked by Terry at the
time he gained probable cause to believe that the lump
in respondent's jacket was contraband.  The State District
Court did not make precise findings on this point, instead
finding simply that the officer, after feeling -a small, hard
object wrapped in plastic- in respondent's pocket, -formed
the opinion that the object . . . was crack . . . cocaine.-
App. to Pet. for Cert. C-2.  The District Court also noted
that the officer made -no claim that he suspected this
object to be a weapon,- id., at C-5, a finding affirmed on
appeal, see 469 N. W. 2d, at 464 (the officer -never
thought the lump was a weapon-).  The Minnesota
Supreme Court, after -a close examination of the record,-
held that the officer's own testimony -belies any notion
that he `immediately'- recognized the lump as crack
cocaine.  See 481 N. W. 2d, at 844.  Rather, the court
concluded, the officer determined that the lump was
contraband only after -squeezing, sliding and otherwise
manipulating the contents of the defendant's pocket--a
pocket which the officer already knew contained no
weapon.  Ibid.
  Under the State Supreme Court's interpretation of the
record before it, it is clear that the court was correct in
holding that the police officer in this case overstepped the
bounds of the -strictly circumscribed- search for weapons
allowed under Terry.  See Terry, 392 U. S., at 26.  Where,
as here, -an officer who is executing a valid search for one
item seizes a different item,- this Court rightly -has been
sensitive to the danger . . . that officers will enlarge a
specific authorization, furnished by a warrant or an
exigency, into the equivalent of a general warrant to
rummage and seize at will.-  Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S.,
at 748 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).  Here, the
officer's continued exploration of respondent's pocket after
having concluded that it contained no weapon was unre-
lated to -[t]he sole justification of the search [under
Terry:] . . . the protection of the police officer and others
nearby.-  392 U. S., at 29.  It therefore amounted to the
sort of evidentiary search that Terry expressly refused to
authorize, see id., at 26, and that we have condemned in
subsequent cases.  See Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S., at
1049, n. 14; Sibron, 392 U. S., at 65-66.
  Once again, the analogy to the plain-view doctrine is
apt.  In Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321 (1987), this Court
held invalid the seizure of stolen stereo equipment found
by police while executing a valid search warrant for other
evidence.  Although the police were lawfully on the
premises pursuant to the search warrant, they obtained
probable cause to believe that the stereo equipment was
contraband only after moving the equipment to permit
officers to read its serial numbers.  The subsequent
seizure of the equipment could not be justified by the
plain-view doctrine, this Court explained, because the
incriminating character of the stereo equipment was not
immediately apparent; rather, probable cause to believe
that the equipment was stolen arose only as a result of
a further search-the moving of the equipment-that was
not authorized by the search warrant or by any exception
to the warrant requirement.  The facts of this case are
very similar.  Although the officer was lawfully in a
position to feel the lump in respondent's pocket, because
Terry entitled him to place his hands upon respondent's
jacket, the court below determined that the incriminating
character of the object was not immediately apparent to
him.  Rather, the officer determined that the item was
contraband only after conducting a further search, one not
authorized by Terry or by any other exception to the
warrant requirement.  Because this further search of
respondent's pocket was constitutionally invalid, the
seizure of the cocaine that followed is likewise unconstitu-
tional.  Horton, 496 U. S., at 140.

                           IV
  For these reasons, the judgment of the Minnesota
Supreme Court is
                                              Affirmed.